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I. Introduction
After the recent financial crisis, the importance of risk management 
has been emphasized among many firms (e.g., financial companies) 
because the failure of risk management is widely recognized as its 
main cause. Among the various causes of the risk management 
failure, Flaherty et al. (2013) elucidated that misguided compensation 
structures enhanced risk-taking incentives. Hence, risk managers were 
compensated with incentive contracts to motivate their selection of risky 
projects rather than safe ones.
Many contracts, which are typical in real firms, provide incentives to 
increase firm risk for their top managers. For instance, option-based 
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compensations for chief executive officers (CEOs) create incentives to 
select risky projects by providing convex payoff structures, thereby 
increasing firm risk.1 Tournament contracts also have a similar effect. 
Intra-organizational CEO promotion tournaments provide senior 
executives below the CEO position with risk-taking incentives, which 
increases firm risk.2
The current study aims to determine the optimal contracts for risk 
managers. Therefore, we consider the principal-agent problem wherein 
an agent plays the role of risk manager on behalf of a principal (firm). 
The effort of the agent considered in our model induces a different 
effect compared with classical principal-agent models. In classical 
agency models, the agent’s effort improves the return of the principal 
in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Thus, the monotone 
likelihood ratio property (MLRP) is assumed.3 However, the effort in our 
model reduces the risk of return. Thus, we cannot assume the MLRP.
Palomino and Prat (2003) examined the moral hazard problem 
where the agent can select the risk of return similar to our model. 
They considered the principal-agent problem wherein the agent has 
a limited liability and can sabotage or destroy the realized outcome.4 
In their model, the agent assumes the role of money manager, and 
can gather information on investment opportunities by exerting effort. 
Thus, the effort of the agent increases the mean of return and its risk 
simultaneously by expanding a set of his feasible portfolios.5 Palomino 
and Prat (2003) corroborated that a one-step bonus contract is one of 
optimal contracts for money managers, under the assumption that the 
agent can select between low or high effort levels.
We also consider the principal-agent problem wherein the agent has 
1 See Smith and Stulz (1985); Guay (1999); Coles et al. (2006); Chava and 
Purnanandam (2010).
2 See Kini and Williams (2012).
3 Note that MLRP implies the first-order stochastic dominance, which means 
that great outcomes are evidence of great effort by the agent. For a detailed 
explanation, see Milgrom (1981).
4 The optimal contract must be a non-decreasing function because of the 
sabotaging ability of the agent. For a detailed explanation, see Innes (1990).
5 More generally, the agent is considered to be able to increase the expected 
return and select its risk, separately. For such models, refer to Hirshleifer and 
Suh (1992), Sung (1995), and Kim (2005) among others.
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a limited liability and can sabotage the realized outcome. However, in 
our model, the agent can reduce the risk of return directly by exerting 
effort. Thus, we assume the likelihood ratio increases from negative and 
decreases to negative as the return increases. This assumption means 
more effort from the agent reduces the risk of return in the sense of 
mean preserving spread.
We analyze the cost minimization problem of the principal containing 
the incentive compatibility and the individual rationality constraints. 
The individual rationality constraint may not be binding at the 
optimum because of the agent’s limited liability, which makes our 
problem difficult to handle. Instead, we first deal with the relaxed cost 
minimization problem wherein the individual rationality constraint is 
removed and analyze the original problem.
We show that a one-step bonus contract is optimal for solving the 
relaxed cost minimization problem, which means that inducing any 
given effort in this bonus contract is cheap. Thus, a one-step bonus 
contract is efficient for the principal in terms of the incentive provision 
for the agent assuming the risk manager role.
This result also implies directly that, if the bonus contract to 
solve the relaxed problem satisfies even the individual rationality 
constraint of the agent, such a bonus contract can solve the original 
cost minimization problem. Because the agent will naturally accept 
an efficient bonus contract in terms of incentive provision. However, 
if such a bonus contract does not satisfy the individual rationality 
constraint, then it cannot solve the original cost minimization problem 
because its expectation is considerably low to be accepted by the agent. 
Thus, a new bonus contract obtained by adding a positive constant can 
solve the original problem, making the individual rationality constraint 
satisfied at a minimum.
It is worth noting that the optimality of one-step bonus contract 
pertains more to risk neutral agent and to increasing pay schedule 
rather than the shape of the likelihood ratio. According to Kim (1997), 
the one-step bonus contract can be an optimal contract for the risk 
neutral agent even under the MLRP. Thus, the optimality of bonus 
contract depends on risk neutrality of the agent and increasing pay 
schedule. Nevertheless, the uniqueness of bonus contract depends 
critically on the likelihood ratio’s shape assumed in this study.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II suggests our basic 
model; Section III provides our results; Section IV deals with the issue 
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of the first-order approach; and Section V concludes this paper.
II. Basic Model
We consider the principal-agent problem wherein an agent assumes 
the role of managing firm risk. The firm (or principal) working on certain 
projects with the high risks and returns concerns high risks inherent 
in them. For the principal that allows an agent to manage and reduce 
risks, the agent’s effort negatively affects firm risk.
The principal and the agent are risk neutral. Upon employment, the 
agent exerts his effort a∈A ≡ [0, ā] with cost c(a) to reduce the risk of 
return x̃. c(a) denotes the effort cost of the agent with c ′(a) > 0 and c ″(a) 
≥ 0. Subsequently, the return, which is affected stochastically by effort 
choice a of the agent, is realized. The principal cannot observe effort 
choice a of the agent, but realized return x is commonly observable 
without costs. Thus, wage contracts for the agent should be designed 
depending on the return x, i.e., w = w(x).
We assume that the agent has a limited liability. Thereafter, wage 
contract w(x) must not always be less than zero [i.e., w(x) ≥ 0 for all 
x∈X = (x, x̄ )], where X is the support of random variable x̃. The agent 
can sabotage or destroy realized return x according to Innes (1990). 
This assumption requires optimal contracts for the agent to be non-
decreasing in x.
Given that the distribution of return x̃ depends on the effort a of the 
agent, its cumulative distribution function is denoted by F(x|a), and 
the corresponding probability density function is denoted by f (x|a). 
F(x|a) and f (x|a) are twice differentiable. Moreover, support X = (x, x̄ ) 
is independent of a. Hence, its lower bound x and upper bound x̄  are 
irrelevant to the effort a of the agent.
The effort a of the agent has a negative effect on the risk of return 
x̃. Therefore, we assume that, for any a, as x increases, the likelihood 
ratio fa (x|a)/f (x|a) increases from negative and decreases to negative.
6 
This assumption, under the condition that E[x|a] is independent of a, 
implies that an increase in effort a reduces the risk of return x̃.
Lemma 1. Suppose that μ(a) ≡ E[x|a] is independent of a. Subsequently, 
6 Hence, we do not assume the MLRP.
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for any a, ∫xFa (t|a)dt ≤ 0 for all x∈X.
Proof. Given that E[fa (x|a)/f (x|a)] = 0 because ∫fa (x|a)dx = 0, the 
likelihood ratio fa (x|a)/f (x|a) for any a should go through x-axis at least 
once. Combining it with the assumption that fa (x|a)/f (x|a) increases 
from negative and then decreases to negative implies that, for any a, 
the sign of fa (x|a)/f (x|a) changes from negative to positive and then 
to negative as x increases. Given that the sign of fa (x|a) has the same 
pattern with fa (x|a)/f (x|a), we have fa (x|a) > 0 for all x∈(x1, x2), but fa 
(x|a) < 0 for all x∈(x, x1)∪(x2, x̄ ), where x1 and x2 are the first and the 
second x-intercepts of fa (x|a), respectively. Given that Fa (x|a) = ∫
xfa 
(t|a)dt, Fa (x|a) is increasing on interval (x1, x2) but decreasing on both 
intervals (x, x1) and (x2, x̄ ). Moreover, because the lower bound x and 
upper bound x̄ of the support are independent of a, F (x|a) = 0 and F (x̄|a) 
= 1 for all a, which implies that Fa (x|a) = Fa (x̄|a) = 0. Thus, the sign of 
Fa (x|a) changes from negative to positive as x increases.
Let F̂(x|a) = ∫xF (t|a)dt. Note that F̂a(x|a) = 0 since F̂(x|a) = 0 for all 
a. In addition, μ(a) ≡ ∫xf(x|a)dx = x + ∫[1 – F(x|a)]dx, where the second 
equality can be derived by using integration by parts. Given that μ(a) is 
independent of a, we have μ′(a) = – ∫Fa (x|a)dx = 0, which is equivalent 
to F̂a(x̄|a) = 0.
For any a, considering that the sign of Fa (x|a) changes from negative 
to positive once as x increases, we have Fa (x|a) < 0 for all x∈(x, x3), but 
Fa (x|a) > 0 for all x∈(x3, x̄ ), where x3 denotes the x-intercept of Fa (x|a), 
which means F̂a(x|a) = ∫
xFa (t|a)dt is decreasing on interval (x, x3) but 
increasing on interval (x3, x̄ ). This scenario, together with F̂a(x|a) = 0 
and F̂a(x̄|a) = 0, implies that F̂a(x|a) is always negative, or equivalently, 
∫xFa (t|a)dt ≤ 0, for all x and a. Q.E.D.
The above lemma shows that, under the condition that the effort of 
the agent does not affect the expected return at all, our assumption 
regarding the likelihood ratio implies that, for any a2 > a1, ∫
xF(t|a1)dt ≥ 
∫xF(t|a2)dt, for all x, thereby indicating that distribution F(x|a1) under 
low effort a1 is a mean preserving spread of distribution F(x|a2) under 
high effort a2 and implies that the increase in the effort of the agent 
reduces the risk of return x̃.7
7 This lemma still holds even in the case where μ(a) is increasing in a. As 
shown in the proof of Lemma 1, F̂a(x̄|a) ≤ 0 is trivial, which makes the proof 
still valid. In this case, Lemma 1 indicates the effort of the agent improves the 
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Our assumption regarding the likelihood ratio can be satisfied 
in many distributions only if the effort of the agent plays a role in 
reducing the risk regardless of whether the expected return is constant 
in his effort. This possibility shows our assumption is not profoundly 
restrictive and the effect of the agent’s effort on the expected return is 
not associated with our assumption. For instance, consider the Normal 
distribution with mean μ(a) > 0 and variance σ2(a) > 0, denoted by x̃ ~ 




( | ) [ ( )] ( ) ( )( ) ( ) .
( | ) ( ) ( ) ( )
af x a x a x a aa a
f x a a a a
µ µ σσ µ
σ σ σ
′− −′ ′= + −
In this equation, if σ(a) is decreasing in a (i.e., σ′(a) < 0), then our 
assumption is satisfied regardless of the sign of μ′(a).
Moreover, the likelihood ratio under our assumption measures the 
variability of return, which indicates that the optimal contract may 
depend on the variability of return, implying that the optimal contract 
should increase and then decrease as x increases. However, when the 
agent can sabotage the realized outcome x, such a contract does not 
work. Specifically, when the outcome is expected to be realized on a 
decreasing part of that contract, the agent receives incentives to destroy 
part of the outcome and report a performance lower than actual one. 
Therefore, when the agent has a sabotaging activity, his contract cannot 
depend on variability.
We consider the cost minimization problem of the principal to induce 
any given effort a > 0. The problem of the principal is represented as 
follows:
Original CMP:
 C(a) ≡ min  ∫w(x)f(x|a)dx,
                                        w(x)∈W
distribution of return F(x|a) in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance. 
Nevertheless, Lemma 1 is proven in the case that μ(a) is independent of a, 
emphasizing that our assumption on the likelihood ratio sufficiently supports 
that the effort of the agent decreases the risk of return x̃ in the sense of mean 
preserving spread.
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subject to
 ∫w(x)fa(x|a)dx – c′(a) = 0,     (IC),
 ∫w(x)f (x|a)dx – c(a) ≥ Ū,      (IR),
where W ≡ {w(x)|w(x) ≥ 0, w′(x) ≥ 0} is the feasible set for the principal 
constrained by limited liability and sabotaging activity of the agent. In 
the original CMP, the first constraint is called the incentive compatibility 
constraint of the agent to adopt the first-order approach. The second 
is called his individual rationality constraint, where Ū denotes the 
reservation utility level of the agent.
If (IR) must be binding at the optimum, optimal contracts used to 
solve the original CMP are any contract to make (IR) and (IC) binding. 
Thus, many optimal contracts may exist in this case. However, because 
the agent has a limited liability, (IR) may not be binding at the optimum. 
Thus, finding the optimal contract to solve the original CMP is not easy. 
Furthermore, if density function f (x|a) does not satisfy the MLRP [i.e., 
fa (x|a)/f (x|a) is not a monotonic function with respect to x for any a], 
then solving the problem will be harder.
Instead of analyzing the original CMP directly, we deal with one 
wherein (IR) is eliminated first, that is,
Relaxed CMP:
 Ĉ(a) ≡ min  ∫w(x)f(x|a)dx  subject to  (IC).
                             w(x)∈W
By solving the relaxed CMP, we can obtain an efficient contract that 
motivates the agent to select target effort a.
Compared with the relaxed CMP, the original CMP has one more 
constraint, that is, constraint (IR). Notice that (IR) indicates whether 
the agent will accept a contract designed by the principal. If the agent 
accepts a solution to the relaxed CMP, this solution can also solve the 
original CMP. However, even if not, the CMP solution can solve the 
original CMP by adding a positive constant.
III. Analysis
Our first aim is to determine the optimal contract to solve the relaxed 
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CMP. The following proposition shows the suitability of a one-step 
bonus contract.
Proposition 1. The optimal contract to solve the relaxed cost minimization 
problem should be a one-step bonus contract.
Proof. An expectation of any nondecreasing function is approximated 
by the sum of nondecreasing step functions. Thus, for an arbitrary 
sequence {xi }i ≥ 0, where xi is increasing in index i, the expectation of w(x) 
given a is represented by the following:
 0
1
[ ( )| ] ( ) [1 ( | )],i i
i
E w x a w x w F x a
≥
= + ∆ × −∑  (1)
where Δwi ≡ w(xi) – w(xi–1), i ≥ 1, is nonnegative because w(x) must be 




[ ( )| ] [ ( | )].i a i
i
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∂
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∂ ∑  (2)
Let yi = Δwi × [1 – F(xi|a)] ≥ 0 for all i ≥ 0. Thereafter, Equations (1) 
and (2) become the following:
 0
1
[ ( )| ] ,i
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respectively. Thus, the relaxed CMP is rewritten as follows:
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where yi ≥ 0 for all i ≥ 0. If an index k exists such that – Fa (xi|a)/[1 – 
F (xi|a)] has a positive maximum value, the solution is 
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but yi = 0 for all i ≠ k, which implies w(xi ) = 0 for all i < k and 
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for all i ≥ k. Q.E.D.
In the relaxed CMP, the principal aims to design the cheapest 
contract to motivate the agent to select target effort a. When the 
principal selects the threshold level to create such incentives, she will 
consider the effect compared with the cost. For instance, consider the 
situation that the principal gives the agent one more dollar to provide 
incentives when the return is not less than certain threshold x. At this 
time, the increment of wage cost, which the principal should pay in the 
expectation sense, is equal to 1 – F(x|a). Meanwhile, the incentive effect 
made from such a wage increase is – Fa(x|a). Accordingly, the principal 
pays the cost of 1 – F(x|a) and obtains the incentive effect of – Fa(x|a). 
Thus, the principal will select the threshold level where ratio – Fa (x|a)/[1 
– F (x|a)] is maximized and, at such a threshold level, provide one-shot 
incentives enough to induce target effort a.
The following lemma clarifies the threshold level characteristics where 
the ratio – Fa(x|a)/[1 – F(x|a)] is maximized.
Lemma 2. Let x = xc∈(x, x̄ ) solve – Fa (x|a)/[1 – F (x|a)] = fa(x|a)/f(x|a). 
For any given a, – Fa(x|a)/[1 – F(x|a)] increases from zero over interval (x, 
xc), but decreases over interval (xc, x̄ ), which implies that – Fa(x|a)/[1 – 
F(x|a)] has a positive maximum value at xc.
Proof. Let 
 







For given a, the likelihood ratio L(x) ≡ fa(x|a)/f(x|a) has increasing 
interval (x, xm) and decreasing interval (xm, x̄ ) by assumption. 
Differentiating ϕ(x) ≡ – Fa(x|a)/[1 – F(x|a)] yields the following:
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which implies that both ϕ(x) is increasing for all x satisfying inequality 
ϕ(x) > L(x) and ϕ(x) is decreasing for all x satisfying inequality ϕ(x) < 
L(x). Moreover, ϕ(x) has critical points at the crossing points of the two 
functions.
Given that ϕ(x) = 0 because F (x|a) = 0 and Fa (x|a) = 0 and that L(x) 
= fa (x|a)/f (x|a) < 0 by the assumption on the likelihood ratio, we have 
ϕ(x) > L(x). In addition, given that 
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 [1 – F(x|a)] = 0 and 
fa (x̄|a)/f (x̄|a) < 0 by the assumption, we have ϕ(x̄ ) = L(x̄ ) < 0. Based on 
these facts, we will show that ϕ(x) crosses L(x) at x = xc from above only 
once, which implies ϕ(x) is increasing on interval (x, xc) but decreasing 
on interval (xc, x̄ ). Thereafter, ϕ(x) has a positive maximum value at x = 
xc.
Claim 1: ϕ(x) must cross L(x) at least once.
Suppose ϕ(x) does not cross L(x) at all, implying that, as ϕ(x) > L(x), 
ϕ(x) is always greater than L(x) [i.e., ϕ(x) > L(x) for all x∈(x, x̄ )]. ϕ(x) is 
strictly increasing in x, which implies that ϕ(x̄ ) > ϕ(x) = 0. However, this 
inequality is contradictory to ϕ(x̄ ) = L(x̄ ) < 0. Thus, ϕ(x) must cross L(x) 
at least once.
Claim 2: ϕ(x) must cross L(x) only once.
Suppose ϕ(x) crosses L(x) at least twice. Denote x-coordinate of the i th 
crossing point by xi. Given that ϕ(x) = 0 and L(x) < 0, we have ϕ(x) > L(x) 
for all x∈(x, x1), but ϕ(x) < L(x) for all x∈(x1, x2). Thus, ϕ(x) is increasing 
on interval (x, x1), but ϕ(x) is decreasing on interval (x1, x2). In this case, 
xm < x2 should be accurate.
8 Given that ϕ(x) crosses L(x) from below at 
8 This inequality can be obtained by making a contradiction. Suppose that 
x2 ≤ xm. Given that ϕ(x) is decreasing on interval (x1, x2), we have ϕ(x1) > ϕ(x2). 
However, given that L(x) is increasing on interval (x, xm) by assumption, L(x1) 
< L(x2). Combining both inequalities with ϕ(x2) = L(x2) yields L(x1) < ϕ(x1), which 
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x2, and L(x) is decreasing on interval (xm, x̄ ) by assumption, it must be 
true that ϕ(x) > L(x) for all x∈(x2, x̄ ), which means ϕ(x) increases over 
interval (x2, x̄ ). Considering ϕ(x2) = L(x2) implies that ϕ(x̄ ) > L(x̄ ), which 
contradicts ϕ(x̄ ) = L(x̄ ). Thus, ϕ(x) crosses L(x) only once.
Denote the x-coordinate of the only crossing point by xc.
9 xc ≤ xm 
should be accurate.10 Given that ϕ(x) = 0 and that ϕ(x) > L(x) for all x∈(x, 
xc), ϕ(x) increases starting from zero over interval (x, xc), which implies 
ϕ(xc) ≡ – Fa(xc|a)/[1 – F(xc|a)] > 0. Given ϕ(x) < L(x) for all x∈(xc, x̄ ), ϕ(x) 
decreases over interval (xc, x̄ ). Therefore, given that ϕ(x) increases from 
zero and then decreases to negative as x increases, ϕ(xc) ≡ – Fa(xc|a)/[1 – 
F(xc|a)] is the positive maximum value of ϕ(x). Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 shows mathematically that, under the assumption that the 
contradicts the definition of x1 (i.e., ϕ(x1) = L(x1)).
9 Note that xm or xc may be a function of a. However, for simple notation, we 
suppress a.
10 This inequality can be also obtained by making a contradiction. Suppose 
that xm < xc. Given that ϕ(x) is increasing on interval (x, xc), ϕ(xm) < ϕ(xc), and given 
that L(x) has a maximum point at xm, L(xm) > L(xc). Combining both inequalities 
with ϕ(xc) < L(xc) gives ϕ(xm) < L(xm), which, together with ϕ(x) = 0 > L(x), implies 
the existence of another x̂∈(x, xm) such that ϕ(x̂) = L(x̂) by intermediate value 
theorem. This makes a contradiction.
Figure 1
Graphs of fa (x|a)/f (x|a) and – Fa (x|a)/[1 – F (x|a)]
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likelihood ratio fa (x|a)/f (x|a) increases from negative and decreases to 
negative, the ratio – Fa(x|a)/[1 – F(x|a)] has a positive maximum value 
at the crossing point of two ratios – Fa(x|a)/[1 – F(x|a)] and fa (x|a)/
f (x|a) (see Figure 1). This result is useful in understanding the following 
proposition.
Proposition 2. Let ŵ(x; a) the optimal contract to solve the relaxed cost 
minimization problem. Subsequently, for a given a > 0, ŵ(x; a) = 0 if x 
< xc, and ŵ(x; a) = b if x ≥ xc, where xc∈(x, x̄ ) satisfies – Fa(xc|a)/[1 – 
F(xc|a)] = fa (xc|a)/f (xc|a), and b = c′(a)/[– Fa(xc|a)] > 0. The compensation 
cost is Ĉ(a) = c′(a) × [1 – F(xc|a)]/[– Fa(xc|a)].
Proof. In Proposition 1, given that the optimal contract for solving 
the relaxed CMP should be a one-step bonus contract, we consider 
the bonus contract, such as w(x; t, b) = 0 for x < t and w(x; t, b) = b 
for x ≥ t. Thereafter, the principal aims to select a pair of (t, b), thereby 
minimizing the expected wage cost ∫w(x; b, t)f(x|a)dx = b[1 – F(t|a)] 
subject to –bFa(t|a) = c′(a). Inserting b = c′(a)/[– Fa(t|a)] > 0 into the 
objective function creates the following simple problem: 
 0
1 ( | )min ( ) ,
( | )t X a




where X0 ≡ {x|Fa(x|a) < 0}. The optimal solution is t maximizing – 
Fa(t|a)/[1 – F(t|a)].
In Lemma 2, the function – Fa(x|a)/[1 – F(x|a)] has a positive maximum 
value at xc, where x = xc solves equation – Fa(x|a)/[1 – F(x|a)] = fa(x|a)/
f(x|a). Thus, the optimal solution is t = xc, and b = c′(a)/[– Fa(xc|a)]. 
Equation 
 





F x aC a b F x a c a
F x a
−′= − = ×
−  
provides the compensation cost. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 can be derived directly by combining the intuition of 
Proposition 1 and the result of Lemma 2. From Proposition 1, – Fa(x|a)/
[1 – F(x|a)] means the ratio of the incentive effect to the wage cost when 
the principal increases the agent’s wage at point x by one more dollar. 
Providing the agent with one-shot bonus at such a point that ratio 
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– Fa(x|a)/[1 – F(x|a)] is maximized is efficient for the principal. From 
Lemma 2, the ratio – Fa(x|a)/[1 – F(x|a)] is maximized at xc which is 
the point where this ratio crosses the likelihood ratio. Therefore, the 
optimal bonus contract has the threshold xc at which ratio – Fa(x|a)/
[1 – F(x|a)] crosses likelihood ratio fa (x|a)/f (x|a), and the amount of 
bonus b = c′(a)/[– Fa(xc|a)], which is determined by (IC). Subsequently, 
the compensation cost is Ĉ(a) = b[1 – F(xc|a)] = c′(a) × [1 – F(xc|a)]/[–Fa 
(xc|a)].
The bonus contract ŵ(x; a) to solve the relaxed CMP can be a solution 
to the original CMP. The following proposition shows the original 
CMP solution is a bonus contract obtained by adding a nonnegative 
constraint to the relaxed CMP solution.
Proposition 3. Let α ≡ max{c(a) + Ū – E[ŵ(x; a)],0}. ŵ(x; a) + α is the 
optimal contract to solve the original cost minimization problem.
Proof. Applying the Lagrange multiplier method to the original CMP 
gives the following:
 max  min ∫w(x)f(x|a)dx – λ[∫w(x)f(x|a)dx – c(a) – Ū] 
                       λ, μ ≥ 0 w(x)∈W
                            – μ[∫w(x)fa(x|a)dx – c′(a)],
where W ≡ {w(x)|w(x) ≥ 0, w′(x) ≥ 0}. Following Kuhn-Tucker’s necessary 
conditions, either λ = 0 and ∫w(x)f(x|a)dx – c(a) – Ū ≥ 0, or λ > 0 and 
∫w(x)f(x|a)dx – c(a) – Ū = 0 should be satisfied at the optimum.
First, consider the case that λ = 0, which implies the original CMP is 
the same with the relaxed CMP. Hence, given that ŵ(x; a) is the unique 
optimal contract to solve the relaxed CMP, ŵ(x; a) is also the unique 
solution to the original CMP. Thus, if E[ŵ(x; a)] ≥ c(a) + Ū, then ŵ(x; a) is 
the unique optimal contract to solve the original CMP.
Let us consider the case that λ > 0. This case implies that E[ŵ(x; a)] 
< c(a) + Ū is true, from which we have α = c(a) + Ū – E[ŵ(x; a)] > 0. By 






c(a) + Ū subject to ∫w(x)fa(x|a)dx = c′(a). Any wage contract under 
which constraints (IC) and (IR) hold equal is a solution to this problem. 
Bonus contract ŵ(x; a) + α satisfies both constraints given that
 ∫[ŵ(x; a) + α]f(x|a)dx – c(a) = ∫ŵ(x; a)f(x|a)dx + α – c(a) = Ū,
112 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
and
 ∫[ŵ(x; a) + α]fa(x|a)dx = ∫ŵ(x; a)fa(x|a)dx = c′(a),
where the first equality holds because ∫fa(x|a)dx = 0. Thus, ŵ(x; a) + α is 
one of the optimal contracts to solve the original CMP. Consequently, if 
E[ŵ(x; a)] < c(a) + Ū, then ŵ(x; a) + α is an optimal contract to solve the 
original CMP. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 shows that the bonus contract which is the unique 
solution to the relaxed CMP, plus a nonnegative constant, can solve the 
original CMP. Consider both the case where the bonus contract ŵ(x; a) 
satisfies constraint (IR) and the case where it does not to understand 
what the Proposition 3 means precisely.
In the case that E[ŵ(x; a)] – c(a) ≥ Ū, we have α = 0 given that Ū + 
c(a) – E[ŵ(x; a)] ≤ 0. Thus, Proposition 3 shows the bonus contract 
ŵ(x; a) can also be a unique solution to the original CMP. This result 
is natural. The bonus contract ŵ(x; a) is the cheapest contract only for 
incentive provision. Furthermore, if the agent accepts this contract [i.e., 
it satisfies (IR)], then putting the cheap contract aside and designing 
other contracts do not make sense. Therefore, ŵ(x; a) is also a unique 
solution to the original CMP.
Meanwhile, if E[ŵ(x; a)] – c(a) < Ū, we have α = Ū + c(a) – E[ŵ(x; a)] > 0. 
Thereafter, Proposition 3 shows that ŵ(x; a) + α is one of the solutions of 
the original CMP. As explained in the proof of Proposition 3, an original 
CMP solution in this case is any wage contract that satisfies constraints 
(IC) and (IR) at the lowest cost. Given that E[ŵ(x; a) + α] – c(a) = Ū, and 
that ∫[ŵ(x; a) + α]fa(x|a)dx = ∫ŵ(x; a)fa(x|a)dx = c′(a), ŵ(x; a) + α satisfies 
both constraints at a minimum cost. Thus, ŵ(x; a) + α is one of the 
original CMP solutions. If the agent rejects the bonus contract ŵ(x; a) 
which is the cheapest for incentive provision, the principal can design 
another bonus contract for the agent. Designing a new contract is 
possible by adding a positive constant α satisfying (IR) at a minimum to 
ŵ(x; a). Thus, ŵ(x; a) + α becomes an original CMP solution.
Corollary 1. C(a) = max{Ĉ(a), c(a) + Ū}, where Ĉ(a) = c′(a) × [1 – F(xc|a)]/
[– Fa(xc|a)].
The above corollary is derived from Proposition 3 directly. Recall that 
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Ĉ(a) is the value function of the relaxed CMP {i.e., Ĉ(a) ≡ E[ŵ(x; a)]}. If 
E[ŵ(x; a)] ≥ c(a) + Ū, then the unique solution to the original CMP is 
ŵ(x; a), from which we have C(a) = E[ŵ(x; a)] ≡ Ĉ(a). Thus, if Ĉ(a) ≥ c(a) 
+ Ū, then C(a) = Ĉ(a). Meanwhile, if E[ŵ(x; a)] < c(a) + Ū, then ŵ(x; a) + α 
is an original CMP solution, and its expectation E[ŵ(x; a) + α] is equal to 
c(a) + Ū as constraint (IR) is binding at the optimum in this case. Thus, 
when Ĉ(a) < c(a) + Ū, we have C(a) = E[ŵ(x; a) + α] = c(a) + Ū. Therefore, 
C(a) is the maximum of Ĉ(a) and c(a) + Ū.
IV. Justifying the First-Order Approach
Conditions justifying the first-order approach in the principal-agent 
problem where signal (i.e., return in our model) is one-dimensional are 
found in Rogerson (1985), Jewitt (1988), and Jung and Kim (2015). 
However, existing conditions cannot be used in our model. The three 
sets of conditions in Rogerson (1985) and Jewitt (1988) include the 
MLRP, which is violated in our model because of the assumption 
regarding the likelihood ratio. Furthermore, the three sets of conditions 
in Jung and Kim (2015) are applicable only when the optimal contract 
is represented as a function of the likelihood ratio, which is violated 
because of the sabotaging ability of the agent in our model.11 Thus, we 
must provide a new condition to validate the first-order approach in our 
model.
Proposition 4. Let xm = argmaxx f a(x|a)/f (x|a), and let x0 = 
min{x|fa(x|a)/f(x|a) = 0}. If F(x|a) is decreasing and convex in a for all 
x∈(x0, xm], the first-order approach is justified.
Proof. In Proposition 3, the optimal contract for solving the cost 
minimization problem is ŵ(x; a) + α, where ŵ(x; a) = b ≡ c′(a)/[– Fa(xc|a)] 
if x ≥ xc and ŵ(x; a) = 0 if x < xc and α ≥ 0. Subsequently, given the 
optimal bonus contract ŵ(x; a), and when the agent selects effort â, his 
expected utility is the following:
 EUA(â) ≡ E[ŵ(x; a)|â] – c(â),
where E[ŵ(x; a)|â] = b[1 – F(xc|â)]. Variable a refers to the target effort 
11 See the conditions of Propositions 1, 4, and 7 in Jung and Kim (2015).
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level of the principal, and variable â means the effort choice level of the 
agent.
Given that c(â ) is increasing and convex in â , if E[ŵ(x; a)|â ] is 
increasing and concave in â , then EUA(â ) is concave in â , which 
validates the first-order approach. Differentiating E[ŵ(x; a)|â] regarding 
â provides the following:
 ˆ[ ( ; )| ] ( | ),ˆ a c





ˆ ˆ  (3)
differentiating once more gives
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Note that xc ≤ xm, as shown in the proof of Lemma 2. Given that 
L(x0) = fa(x0|a)/f(x0|a) = 0 by definition, that L(xc) = fa(xc|a)/f(xc|a) = – 
Fa(xc|a)/[1 – F(xc|a)] > 0 from Lemma 2, and that L(x) is increasing on 
interval (x, xm), x0 < xc is true. Thus, xc always exists in interval (x0, xm]. 
If, for all x∈(x0, xm), F(x|a) is decreasing and convex in a, then the right 
hand side of Equation (3), – bFa(xc|â), is positive and the right hand side 
of Equation (4), – bFaa(xc|â), is negative, which means E[ŵ(x; a)|â] is 
increasing and concave in â. Q.E.D.
The first-order approach can be justified by providing the conditions 
under which the expected utility of the agent under the optimal contract 
is concave in his effort choice. In our model, the agent is risk-neutral, 
and the optimal contract for solving the original CMP is ŵ(x; a) + α, 
where α = max{c(a) + Ū – E[ŵ(x; a)], 0} in Proposition 3. Subsequently, 
when the agent is compensated with the optimal bonus contract ŵ(x; 
a) + α and chooses an arbitrary effort â, the expected utility is equal to 
EUA(â) = E[ŵ(x; a)|â] + α – c(â). Thus, given that c(â) is increasing and 
convex in â, the first-order approach is justified under the condition to 
guarantee that E[ŵ(x; a)|â] is increasing and concave in â.
Note that E[ŵ(x; a)|â] = b[1 – F(xc|â)], where xc solves – Fa(x|a)/[1 
– F(x|a)] = fa(x|a)/f(x|a) and b ≡ c′(a)/[– Fa(xc|a)] > 0. Thereafter, the 
condition that F(xc|â) is decreasing and convex in â makes E[ŵ(x; a)|â] 
increasing and concave in â. Nevertheless, xc may not be calculated 
explicitly for a pre-specified distribution F(x|a). To overcome this 
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problem, we must find an interval on which xc lies. As xc is a maximum 
point of – Fa(x|a)/[1 – F(x|a)], xc exists in interval (x0, xm] (i.e., xc∈(x0, 
xm]) in Lemma 2. Thus, if F(x|â) is decreasing and is convex in â for 
all x∈(x0, xm], then 1 – F(xc|â) is increasing and concave in â, which 
implies that E[ŵ(x; a)|â] is increasing and concave in â.
Certain examples can satisfy the condition that F(x|a) is decreasing 
and convex in a for all x∈(x0, xm] under the assumption that fa (x|a)/
f (x|a) increases from negative and then decreases to negative as x 
increases.
Example 1.
Normal distribution case. Consider the normal distribution: x̃∼N(μ, 
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Thus, we have xm = μ.
The cumulative distribution function is equal to the following:
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where z̃ ≡ (x̃ – μ)/σ(a) and N(z) = ∫z n(t)dt with n(z) = 21/ 2 exp( /2).zπ −
Note that N′(z) = n(z) and n′(z) = – z × n(z). Thereafter, differentiating 
F(x|a) regarding a provides the following:
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for all x ≤ xm = μ, where the inequality holds by σ′(a) ≤ 0. Differentiating 
ln[–Fa(x|a)] regarding a provides the following:
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This equation shows that when σ″(a)/σ′(a) ≤ 2 σ′(a)/σ(a), Faa(x|a) ≥ 0 
for all x ≤ xm = μ. Therefore, the first-order approach is valid under the 
condition that σ″(a)/σ′(a) ≤ 2 σ′(a)/σ(a).
Example 2.
Convex mixture distribution case. Consider a convex mixture of 
any two symmetric distributions: f(x|a) = α(a)g(x) + [1 – α(a)]h(x) with 
increasing and concave α(a)∈[0, 1], where g(x) and h(x) are symmetric 
probability density functions with similar mean μ. For our assumption, 
assume that r(x) ≡ g(x)/h(x) is increasing on interval (x, μ).
Given that g(x) and h(x) are symmetric around mean μ, G(μ) = H(μ) = 
1/2 and r(x) ≡ g(x)/h(x) is also symmetric about line x = μ. Then, as r(x) 
is increasing on interval (x, μ) and decreasing on interval (μ, x̄ ), r(x) has 
a maximum value at x = μ.
Define l(t) ≡ α′(a)(t – 1)/[1 + α(a)(t – 1)]. We have
 
( )( ) 1
( )( | ) ( ( )).
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Given that l(t) is an increasing function {i.e., l ′(t) = α′(a)/[1 + α(a)(t – 1)]2 
> 0} and that r(x) is symmetric about line x = μ, fa (x|a)/f (x|a) = l(r(x)) is 
also symmetric. Thus, as r(x) has a maximum value at x = μ, fa (x|a)/
f (x|a) also has a maximum value at x = μ. This scenario indicates 
that xm = μ. Note that fa (x|a)/f (x|a) < 0 and fa (xm|a)/f (xm|a) > 0 from 
E[fa (x|a)/f (x|a)] = 0, which implies that r(x) < 1, r(x0) = 1, and r(μ) > 1.
Define
 ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) 1] ( ) .
x x
R x G x H x g t h t dt r t h t dt≡ − = − = −∫ ∫
From the definition, R(x) = G(x) – H(x) = 0 and R(μ) = G(μ) – H(μ) = 0. 
Given that r(x) is increasing on interval (x, μ), we have r(x) ≤ 1 for all x∈
(x, x0), but r(x) ≥ 1 for all x∈(x0, μ). Given that R′(x) = [r(x) – 1]h(x), R(x) 
is decreasing on interval (x, x0) but increasing on interval (x0, μ). This 
scenario, together with R(x) = R(μ) = 0, implies that R(x) ≤ 0 for all x ≤ μ.
117OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR RISK MANAGERS
The cumulative distribution function is equal to the following:
 F(x|a) = H(x) + α(a)[G(x) – H(x)] = H(x) + α(a)R(x).
Subsequently, for all x ≤ μ,
 Fa(x|a) = α′(a)R(x) ≤ 0,
where the inequality holds as α′(a) ≥ 0 and R(x) ≤ 0 for all x ≤ μ, and
 Faa(x|a) = α″(a)R(x) ≥ 0,
where the inequality holds as α″(a) ≤ 0, and R(x) ≤ 0 for all x ≤ μ. 
Hence, F(x|a) is decreasing and convex in a for all x ≤ xm = μ under the 
condition that α(a) is increasing and concave, which justifies the first-
order approach.
V. Conclusion
We consider the principal-agent problem where an agent assumes 
the role of a risk manager. We aim to find the optimal wage contract 
that will solve the cost minimization problem to induce any given effort. 
However, given that directly solving the original cost minimization 
problem is difficult because of the possibility that the individual 
rationality constraint may be nonbinding under the limited liability 
of the agent, we first analyze the relaxed cost minimization problem, 
wherein the individual rationality constraint is eliminated from the 
original cost minimization problem.
We affirmed that a solution to the relaxed cost minimization problem 
should be a one-step bonus contract, which indicates that a bonus 
contract is efficient in terms of incentive provision. Our result confirms 
that, if the bonus contract solving the relaxed cost minimization 
problem satisfies the individual rationality constraint of the agent, then 
it can also solve the original cost minimization problem. Otherwise, a 
new bonus contract, which is obtained by adding a positive constant to 
the bonus contract, can solve the original cost minimization problem.
If the individual rationality constraint is satisfied under the bonus 
contract for solving the relaxed cost minimization problem, it naturally 
becomes the unique solution to the original cost minimization problem, 
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too. Otherwise, such a bonus contract cannot solve the original cost 
minimization problem because the agent will reject it. The reason is 
that the expected wage level of such a bonus contract is considerably 
low to satisfy the individual rationality constraint. Thus, by adding an 
appropriate constant which enables the individual rationality constraint 
to hold equal to such a bonus contract, the principal can design 
another bonus contract to solve the original cost minimization problem.
Finally, we provided the condition under which the first-order 
approach is valid. The first-order approach is justified under the 
condition to guarantee that the expected utility of the agent given the 
optimal bonus contract is concave in his effort. Thus, if the distribution 
is convex in effort for any outcome in the interval that the threshold 
level of the optimal bonus contract belongs to, then the agent’s expected 
utility is concave in his effort, which validates the first-order approach. 
We presented certain examples that satisfy such a condition.
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